In this paper, based on the core of the stochastic cooperative game (Oviedo, 2000, pp. 519-524), We define the − ε core of the stochastic cooperative game. Thus, we recuperate the defect in theory that the core is empty usual. And we introduce some characters and properties about the kind ε -core.
Introduction
It is well known, there is difficult that the core of cooperative game, as a solution of the game because of the core of the game is empty usual. The core of the stochastic cooperative game which Suijs et al. developed in 1995. In order to solve the problem, this paper import the concept of ε -core and discuss the properties of the ε -core.
Basic definitions
The stochastic cooperative game which Suijs introduced denoted by { } ( ) ( ) N , ,
, N is the set of players,
S
Χ is the payoff function of the coalitions S ,and every stochastic payoff has finite expectation.
We denote the stochastic payoff has 
are two stochastic payoff. If exist is a coalition S , for all of i S ∈ ,we have
with respect to S , and denoted by ( ) (
We define the core of stochastic cooperative game Γ as the sets of payoffs which are undominated, and denoted by 
2. The ε core of a repeater n -person stochastic cooperative game
be a n -person stochastic cooperative game, R ε ∈ ,we denote the ε -core of
,
When ε sufficient enough, ( )
is the least core of Γ and denoted
It is noted that when the ε -core is not empty, the elements of the ε -core are not always stochastic payoffs of the stochastic cooperative game.
Result
be a repeater n -person stochastic cooperative game,if ε ε′
Then the stochastic payoff ( )
there exist ε and ε ′ ,satisfy:
Proof. First, we make proof
Γ be a stochastic payoff , and ( )
For ( )
From (1) and (2): 
